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There is little doubt that European intellectual development, in various fields, 
has been marked by the contribution of Jesuits. The emergence of the natural sciences 
is no exception. Just three years before the first publication of Nicolaus Copernicus’ 
De Revolutionibus, the Society of Jesus was officially founded in 1540. Eleven years 
later, we see the beginnings of what eventually became the Roman College, a centre 
of learning whose influence regarding theology and natural philosophy extended over 
all Europe and beyond. The Jesuits’ apostolic style took shape therefore during the 
turbulent years of the birth and development of natural science. The scientific 
revolution has been studied in various ways. Some early accounts favor a so-called 
Whig interpretation whereby the sequence of events is seen as a steady, victorious 
march from the age of darkness towards the light. Other, more responsible accounts 
reconstruct the narrative in terms of paradigm-shifts. In many of these accounts, the 
Jesuit project in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is often portrayed as ending in 
a tragic failure. Jesuits are depicted as being at first favorable to the new science. 
There is then the decree from higher authorities that blocks their open attitude; and 
henceforth they become the major resistance to scientific progress. The result of their 
opposing efforts in this area is then portrayed as a total failure.1 Fortunately, more 
recent accounts of how science develops are more sophisticated and responsible. Imre 
Lakatos proposed that our main focus should be on research programs. This idea was 
certainly a step in the right direction. It invites historians to concentrate first on the 
core of such projects in terms of theories that are considered indisputable by a specific 
group of researchers. This core is seen as surrounded by a protective belt of auxiliary 
hypotheses that explain why the core theories should not be rejected when 
contradictory evidence arises. The task of researchers is therefore to formulate the 
simplest, and thus most acceptable, auxiliary hypothesis that saves the core. On this 
account, perseverance with the core project is of the essence of scientific practice.2  
My aim in this paper is to work within the framework of this sophisticated 
version of scientific change so as to gain a deeper understanding of the Jesuits’ role in 
the scientific revolution. Their received research program was Aristotelian 
cosmology. Their efforts to construct one protective belt after another to shield the 
core principles involved in this cosmology were fuelled not only by the basic instinct 
to persevere, as Lakatos describes. It was propelled as well by the impact of official 
prohibitions from the side of Church authorities that tended to avoid change. The 
clash between Copernicanism and the Church is marked primarily by three dates. The 
first condemnation occurred in 1616. This was directed primarily against 
Copernicanism as a theory. The second, more drastic condemnation occurred in 1633: 
Copernicanism was declared heretical and Galileo was placed under house arrest. The 
third significant year was 1757 when the Congregation removed the 1616 decree from 
the new edition of the Index of forbidden books. This meant that the previous 
condemnations were effectively, although not officially, withdrawn. The Galileo case 
 
1 For an example of such simplistic historiography, see Andrew D. White, A history of the warfare of 
science with theology in Christendom (New York: Appleton, 1896; republished Prometheus Books, 
1993). 
2 Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and methodology of scientific research programmes,” in: I. Lakatos and 
A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and growth of knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), pp. 95–195. 
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cannot, however, be associated exclusively with these three dates. It has had 
repercussions along the centuries up to our own times. To situate this paper within 
reasonable limits, I will concentrate on a period of about a hundred years, starting 
from the first condemnation of 1616 and ending in the early eighteenth century. My 
basic assumption will be that the Church restrictions, represented primarily by the two 
condemnations, were not as paralyzing for Jesuit intellectuals as has often been 
thought. They left considerable space for maneuvering. Valuable contributions to the 
debates that were forging the very heart of the emerging new paradigm were still 
possible. Within this space, Jesuits weren’t engaged in spectacular new discoveries. 
Nevertheless, they exerted an important influence. They were essentially engaged in 
the indispensable task of exhausting all the potential of Aristotelian cosmology. In this 
paper, I will show how they did this primarily by trying to build intellectual bridges to 
ensure coherence between three regions of the cosmological imagination of the time. 
They struggled first to safeguard coherence between the received Aristotelian view, 
the new empirical data and everyday experience. The obvious way to save the idea of 
a stationary earth was to support the proposal of Tycho Brahe, in which planets 
revolve around the Sun while the Sun itself revolves around a stationary earth. Aware 
of the mounting evidence against the earth’s privileged position, however, they 
realized that this option was being steadily undermined. Various strategies were 
therefore adopted. To identify these strategies, I will determine first the exact nature 
of the restrictions imposed on Jesuit scholars by Church authorities. After this first 
section, I will identify three prominent strategies evident in Jesuit writings. In the 
concluding section, these strategies will be briefly evaluated and discussed in the light 
of the intellectual output of Jesuits in later centuries leading up to our own times. The 
overall result throws light on how scientific development depends on the space left 
available by social and political restrictions.  
1. The space available after the prohibitions 
A prohibition is a kind of boundary. It doesn’t in itself determine what should 
be said or taught. It only indicates what shouldn’t. The sanctions that proscribed the 
Jesuits from endorsing Copernicanism did not block their activity completely. Let me 
first distinguish the situation before the early 1600s from the situation afterwards. 
Before the early 1600s, Jesuits were used to three main constraints. These 
were all included in official documents produced by the Society itself. They were 
norms about their apostolic style.3 The first is found in their own Constitutions, 
officially approved in 1558. In Part IV we find Aristotle being given uncontested 
prominence in the kind of formation the Jesuits were meant to have: “In logic, natural 
and moral philosophy, and metaphysics, the doctrine of Aristotle should be followed, 
as also the other liberal arts.”4 This shows something of the founder’s confidence in 
the approved doctrine of the time. In various points in the Constitutions, Ignatius had 
included concessions for different times and places. Many commentators have seen in 
these concessions his particular wisdom in government. As regards doctrine, however, 
he had never contemplated the possibility of a new cosmology. For him, Aristotle 
apparently was to be the only point of reference for the entire Society for ever. The 
second constraint was an important nuance added to the Constitutions by the third 
 
3 I draw here from Marcus Hellyer, Catholic physics: Jesuit natural philosophy in early modern 
Germany (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005). 
4 Ignatius of Loyola, The constitutions of the Society of Jesus and their complementary norms, trans. 
G.E. Ganss, S.J. (Saint Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1996), Part IV, Chapter 14, § 3. 
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General Congregation in 1573. Commenting on the part of the Constitutions just 
quoted, this Congregation specified that, in philosophy, Aristotle had to be taught not 
for his own sake but as a support for theology. In this way, the ultimate aim of 
philosophical studies, which included the study of physics, was made clear. 
Theologians were given the final word.  
The third constraint was more substantial: the 1599 Ratio Studiorum. This 
document charted the educational policy of the rapidly growing Jesuit colleges across 
Europe. It took some years to compile because it was the result of deliberation by the 
fifth General Congregation concluded in 1593. It is worthwhile highlighting this 
Congregation’s groundwork before referring directly to the Ratio itself. In Decree 56 
of the Congregation, we find the following significant directives: 
1) By all means, Ours should consider St. Thomas as their special teacher, and 
they should be obliged to follow him in scholastic theology, first, because our 
Constitutions commend this to us in §1 of chapter 14 of Part 4 and the 
supreme pontiff, Clement VIII, has indicated that he desires it; and second, 
because letter K of chapter 1 of part 8 of the Constitutions admonish us to 
select the doctrine of one writer, and at this time there can hardly be a doctrine 
more solid and safe. St. Thomas is deservedly regarded by all as the prince of 
theologians.  
2) Nonetheless, Ours are not to be understood as being so bound to St. Thomas 
that they may not deviate from him in any respect. For those very ones who 
most strongly profess themselves to be Thomists differ from him at times. And 
it is not fitting that Ours be more tightly bound to St. Thomas than are the 
Thomists themselves. 
3) In questions that are purely philosophical and also in those pertaining to 
Scripture and the canons, it will also be permissible to follow others who have 
professedly been engaged in those areas.5 
Following these directives, those responsible for the final version of the Ratio 
summarized the issue in the following clear mandate:  
Teachers of philosophy should not depart from Aristotle in matters of any 
moment unless there happens to be something foreign to the teaching that 
academics everywhere approve or, even more so, if there is question of a 
teaching that is contrary to the orthodox faith. If there are any arguments of 
this or another philosopher against the faith, they should strongly endeavor to 
refute them, in accord with the Lateran Council.6 
The Jesuits were aware of the possibility of finding elements in the Aristotelian 
corpus that go against the faith. Moreover, they saw themselves not as innovators, 
called to explore new intellectual territory, but as followers of the general trend of 
responsible scholars. For a deviation from Aristotle to be acceptable, the basic 
criterion was to wait until the debate subsides. Jesuit scholars were then expected to 
adopt the opinion of the majority. Although this looks very much like a conservative 
 
5 J.W. Padberg S.J., M.D. O’Keefe S.J., and J.L. McCarthy S.J., For matters of greater moment: the 
first thirty Jesuit general congregations (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1994), p. 207. 
Surprisingly, point 1 of this official text of the Congregation misquotes the Constitutions. The point 
indicated by the letter K doesn’t in fact deal with following a single author but a single doctrine. 
Moreover, although point 2 shows an opening towards some diversity, it is still centered on Thomistic 
interpretation. The scientific revolution did not fit into this model. The stationary earth had been 
defended by Aristotle in De caelo 2.13.293b.16–32 and 2.14.296a.24–26; and by Aquinas in his 
commentary on De caelo. 
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Cf.: Padberg et al., p. 199. The 5th Lateran Council (1512–1517) had decreed that, in the search for 
truth, faith should be given priority over the exercise of reason.  
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strategy, one needs to recall that, at that time, the Ratio was overall a courageous, 
innovative document.7 It allowed even for disagreement with Aquinas: “one is never 
to talk of St. Thomas without honoring him, following him willingly whenever 
possible; one is to depart from him with reverence and reluctance.”8 
These three factors determined the Jesuit frame of mind as the new cosmology 
was on the verge of sweeping across Europe. The second phase of prohibitions can be 
seen as starting after the early 1600s. As Rome went through the Galileo crisis, the 
Vatican condemned Copernicanism in 1616 and then, in 1633, declared it heretical, 
placing Galileo under house arrest. Another prohibition arose from the Jesuit 
authorities themselves, who wanted to update their position after the Vatican decision. 
Their official statement was the Ordinatio pro studiis superioribus of 1651, one of the 
fruits of the Ninth General Congregation. This was practically a list of philosophical 
and theological opinions declared forbidden in Jesuit teaching. The main idea was that 
Aristotle and Aquinas had to be given pre-eminence, and that the most common 
opinion should be adhered to. In spite of this conservative attitude, we find yet again 
that some doors were left open. Some points that had seemed certain about thirty-five 
years earlier were not included. For instance the fluidity of the heavens had been 
considered an unacceptable opinion. The Ordinatio never included this in its list. It 
implied thereby that, even though fluidity contradicts Aristotle’s theory of solid 
spheres, it could be taught if ever it became the more common opinion. 
These prohibitions had various effects on Jesuits.9 In general, the 
pronouncements of the Roman Inquisition, set up in 1542, had high authority even 
though they lacked the status of infallible teaching. The Jesuit Giovanni Battista 
Riccioli in his Almagestum Novum (1651), described the moral obligation imposed on 
Catholics by the 1633 condemnation: 
As there has been no definition on this matter by the Sovereign Pontiff or by a 
General Council directed and approved by him, it is in no way of faith that the 
sun moves and the earth is motionless; … Still, all Catholics are obliged … at 
least not to firmly teach the opposite of what the decree lays down (& saltem 
ad non docendum absolute oppositum).10 
Strictly speaking, the Roman Inquisition had the authority to exercise its powers in all 
Catholic countries except Spain, which had its own Inquisition. In practice, however, 
it had no power outside Italy. Sovereigns of France and of Germanic lands, even 
though Catholic, would not tolerate interference from Rome. There was always the 
 
7 Critics of the Jesuits submitted the Ratio to the Inquisition twice. See J. Consentino, “Le matematiche 
nelle “Ratio Studiorum” della Compagnia di Gesù” in: Miscellanea Storica Ligure II/2 (1970): 171–
213. 
8 Ratio Studiorum, para. 6 [212]. Note that Jesuit Thomism is not equivalent to Dominican Thomism. 
See Rivka Feldhay, “Knowledge and salvation in Jesuit culture,” Science in Context 1 (1987): 195–
213; in her judgment (p. 201), “Jesuit Thomism, in comparison with Dominicans’, was mainly 
distinguished by its particular openness, stemming from the Jesuits’ quest to educate the entire Catholic 
secular elite on the one hand, and from the independent intellectual interest developed by the second 
generation of scholars, on the other hand.” See also Francis Winterton, “Philosophy among the Jesuits”, 
Mind 12 (1887): 254–74; Steven J., Harris, “Transposing the Merton thesis: apostolic spirituality and 
the establishment of the Jesuit scientific tradition,” Science in Context 3 (1989): 29–65.  
9 I have not exhausted all the prohibitions. For more cases of censorship, see: Richard J. Blackwell, 
Galileo, Bellarmine and the Bible (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), p. 149; M-P 
Lerner, “L’entrée de Tycho Brahe chez les jésuites, ou le chant du cygne de Clavius” in: Luce Giard 
(ed.), Les jésuites à la Renaissance: système éducatif et production du savoir (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1995), pp. 145–86.  
10 Giovanni Battista Riccioli, Almagestum novum (Bononiæ: Ex typographia hæredis Victorij Benatij, 
1651), Tome 1, Liber Secundus, Caput III, Scholia, p. 52. 
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possibility that the Roman authorities impose spiritual sanctions such as 
excommunication on offenders beyond the Italian peninsula, but they never in fact did 
so in the case of Copernicanism.11 
In brief then, the constraints on the Jesuit intellectual output in the latter half 
of the seventeenth century were of various kinds. Whatever the reasons behind them, 
they did leave some space for maneuvering. They obliged the Jesuits to trace a risky 
path across slippery intellectual territory. Jesuits were obliged to refute 
Copernicanism. They felt obliged also, for the sake of intellectual integrity, to accept 
genuine evidence when they saw it. They wanted to avoid both useless speculation 
and uncritical revisionism. How did they manage all this? 
2. Probability arguments  
 The first Jesuit strategy worth highlighting involves the question of certainty. 
Endorsing or defending Copernicanism wasn’t an option. This ban, however, did not 
forbid anyone from discussing and evaluating the probability of the claims of 
heliocentrism. Taking this opportunity, Jesuits started to slide away from an attitude 
of clear-cut distinctions between truth and falsity, as was fashionable in high 
scholasticism. They embarked on a more subtle discussion of the merits of the 
different, contesting hypotheses.  
 History shows that changes of ideas are never abrupt. New explanations that 
gain credibility do so gradually: from being regarded as certainly false to being 
regarded as somewhat possible, then to being regarded as perhaps probable, and 
finally to being regarded as warranted or true. The main ingredient here is 
hypothetical reasoning. For medieval schoolmen, such reasoning was an exercise in 
entertaining ideas that did not fit the accepted system. An absurdity for Aristotelian 
and Ptolemaic science could nevertheless be entertained. Some explanations started 
thus to be mentioned and discussed only, as it were, for the sake of the argument. 
Spelling out the forbidden claim, however, is already a slight concession. It allows a 
peep at its consequences; and this makes all the difference. The schoolmen were 
encouraged in this procedure by the theologians’ admonition that God’s omnipotence 
cannot be restricted by the limitations of the Aristotelian or Ptolemaic paradigm. The 
impossibilities of natural philosophy thus became possibilities de potentia Dei 
absoluta. This is just one illustration of how, if the climate of opinion changes, or if 
new evidence becomes available, what had been considered anathema could start 
becoming a possibility. In his discussion on this point, the historian Amos 
Funkenstein writes: 
Even where schoolmen in the Middle Ages traded Aristotle’s “impossibilities” 
for possibilities de potentia Dei absoluta, they regarded them only as 
incompossible with our universe. With the usage of ideal experiments in the 
seventeenth century many such incompossibles became limiting cases of our 
 
11 The attitudes of Jesuits depended also on their country: for Germany and Italy see Hellyer, Catholic 
Physics; for the situation in France, see John I. Russell, S.J., “Catholic astronomers and the Copernican 
system after the condemnation of Galileo,” Annals of Science 46 (1989): 365–86. In France, the effects 
of the 1633 condemnation weren’t uniform. For instance, on the one hand, we find Descartes 
abandoning the publication of his nearly complete manuscript Le Monde. On the other hand, we find an 
edition of Galileo’s condemned Dialogues published at Lyons in 1641, in defiance of the Index; it even 
had a formal Imprimatur from the diocesan authorities. 
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universe; even if they do not describe our universe, they are necessary to 
explain it.12  
 This offers a good sketch of what the Jesuits did in the aftermath of the 
Galilean controversy. Constrained to work within the boundaries of the various 
prohibitions, the Jesuits started by ignoring Copernicanism. They then started 
included it in textbooks as a false hypothesis. This inclusion allowed it to be described 
and even sometimes discussed at length. The Jesuits were thus instrumental in making 
Copernicanism shift from being seen as false because impossible, to being considered 
possible but improbable, and finally to being considered possible and probable – 
which is just a step away from being considered true. This technique was effective 
especially after the Ordinatio of 1651. As indicated above, this document obliged 
Jesuits to stick to Aristotle and Aquinas, but did so in a way that explained how 
departures from these authors could be made. As a consequence, the imprimatur was 
also available to those who made a judicious use of “probable” and “hypothesis”. 
Jesuit scholars were thus allowed to publish commentaries on various aspects of the 
new cosmology even though the official position of the Vatican was against them. 
This strategy is evident in various works of the time, especially in those published in 
the German speaking provinces. On this, Marcus Hellyer writes: “Provided Aristotle 
or St. Thomas’ opinion was granted a degree of probability, other opinions could be 
openly discussed.”13 
There are two crucial consequences of the Jesuit use of probability: one 
concerns biblical interpretation, and the other the role of superiors. The point about 
biblical interpretation refers to the principle of accommodation. Put simply, this 
principle stipulates that scripture speaks a human language appropriate, or 
accommodated, to the mentality of the time. Aquinas spells it out: “Scripture speaks 
according to the opinion of the people.”14 This is to be distinguished from a related 
but different idea, often referred to by the term “concordism”. This idea concerns a 
specific way of interpreting the Bible. It stipulates that, whenever well-established 
empirical evidence stands opposed to some Biblical claim about physical nature, the 
Bible should be given an appropriate reinterpretation so that its descriptions regain 
coherence with empirical data. For instance, the six days of creation in Genesis need 
to be reinterpreted as six, very long periods of time so as to be in line with current 
views on the age of the universe. Concordism corresponds to a maximalist version of 
the principle of accommodation as opposed to a minimalist version.15 Concordism is 
maximalist in the sense that the Bible is assumed to contain all science and 
metaphysics. This content, heavily clothed in metaphors, remains inaccessible to the 
uneducated masses of the various periods in the course of history. The minimalist 
version is the exact opposite. The Bible is here assumed neutral as regards physics and 
metaphysics. It is assumed lacking in significant descriptive content regarding the 
nature of things. Hence, on the minimalist view, the Bible neither contradicts science 
nor contains it in a hidden way.   
 
12 Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the scientific imagination from the Middle Ages to the seventeenth 
century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 17. 
13  Hellyer, Catholic Physics, p. 46. 
14 Summa Theologiae 1-2, Q 98 a3. The principle goes back to at least Augustine, who argued that God 
“knows much better than man what pertains by accommodation to each period of time (qui multo magis 
quam homo novit, quid cuique tempori accommodate adhibeatur),” Aurelius Augustinus, Epistulae, Al. 
Goldbacher (ed.), Pars III (Vindobonae: F. Trempsky; Lipsiae: G. Freytag, 1904), Epistula 138. 1.5, p. 
130. 
15 I draw this distinction from Funkenstein, Theology and the scientific imagination, pp. 213–9. 
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These various trends were all very important during the Galileo controversy. 
In his letter to the Duchess Christina, Galileo insisted that, if time were to stand still in 
the Ptolemaic universe, it is not enough that “the sun in Gideon stand still,” as written 
in Joshua 10, 12. The sphere of the fixed stars must cease to move, as well. Hence, 
Galileo argued, whether we accept Ptolemy or Copernicus, there is no way of 
interpreting the biblical text as descriptively responsible. There is no science being 
clothed by ordinary language here. Whether we follow Ptolemy or Copernicus, the 
text has to be considered metaphorical. It is clear, therefore, that Galileo was a 
champion of the minimalist version of the principle of accommodation. His 
opponents, on the contrary, were crude maximalists, insisting on the supreme 
relevance of the descriptive content of the biblical text, even when such content was 
marginal as regards the main point of the text. 
With the Jesuits’ use of probability arguments, the case for such crude 
maximalist ideas was considerably weakened. Once they started to include in 
textbooks Copernicanism as a hypothesis worthy of discussion, the arguments of 
those who used the Bible against heliocentrism were progressively undermined. 
Copernicanism underwent the stages mentioned above. From being seen as false 
because impossible, it started being considered possible but improbable, and finally to 
being considered possible and probable. Geocentrism underwent the opposite 
development; and so did the maximalist understanding of Scripture. The idea that the 
Bible contains hidden but true descriptions of the deep nature of the material world 
used to be accepted as true. Due to the Jesuits’ probability-tinted reasoning, its status 
started to shift. It gradually came to be considered possible but improbable, until it 
finally ended up being considered impossible. This is not to say that the descriptive 
content of Scripture was sloughed off completely. Details of a historical nature, 
ranging from simple facts, like the fact that Jacob had twelve sons, to specific dates 
for battles and political changes, were always retained as genuine descriptions. These 
are central to the message of the text.16 Other details, however, found their way into 
the text only as decorative extras. Cosmological ideas are among these latter. The 
Jesuits’ way of engaging in intellectual work after the Galileo case was instrumental 
in uncovering the true features of the principle of accommodation, namely as 
stipulating that God, in his infinite wisdom, had accommodated His message to the 
various mentalities in the course of history not by adjusting, simplifying and 
packaging the truths of cosmology but by adjusting and simplifying those of theology. 
Apart from these issues regarding biblical interpretation, there is a second 
significant consequence of the Jesuit recourse to probability arguments. This second 
consequence concerns the role of superiors. As the new cosmology found its way into 
textbooks, the evidence in its favor started becoming stronger. Some aspects of the 
ancient cosmology, like celestial immutability and the reality of qualities, soon 
became untenable. This made Copernicanism gain credibility. Jesuit natural 
philosophers started adopting a more positive attitude towards the new cosmology. 
Since they were constrained to avoid admitting its truth, however, they had to think of 
a way of presenting the stark incompatibility of the two systems in the very same 
book. They often did this by shifting the responsibility onto superiors. They 
practically started putting the blame gently on superiors for not allowing them to draw 
the obvious conclusions regarding the superiority of the new cosmology. The Jesuit 
Claude Miliet Dechales, who taught mathematics in Jesuit Colleges in Marseilles and 
 
16 See Robert Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini (12 April 1615) in: Blackwell, Galileo, Bellarmine and 
the Bible, pp. 265–8. 
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Lyons in the 1670s, was typical. In spite of his sympathies towards Copernicanism, he 
still felt obliged to reject it. He applied therefore the last available argument: loyalty 
to Scripture and the Church. He admits that Copernicus gives the simplest 
explanation. In the same breath, however, he adds that the Church has to be obeyed. If 
it were not for the authority of Scripture, he himself would be a Copernican.17 
Something similar is found in the writings of the Jesuit Melchior Cornaeus (1598–
1665), theology professor at Würzburg University. At one point in his 1657 
philosophy textbook, he draws a clear contrast between what he thinks is correct and 
what his superiors want. The specific question wasn’t about the motion of the 
heavens, but about the reality of the distinct qualities of heaviness and lightness, as 
prescribed by Aristotelians. Cornaeus writes: 
What I have just taught about heaviness and lightness according to the opinion 
of learned men, I myself have openly taught and held for many years. Now 
because the authority of my superiors commands something else, I say that it 
is probable that heaviness and lightness are two positive qualities ... And 
because authority commands that we subscribe to this opinion, I subscribe and 
I approve of it.18 
The responsibility is clearly shifted onto Church authorities. The initial discussion on 
the merits of the various competing hypotheses has resulted in one of the hypotheses 
becoming much more probable than the other. When the only justification for the old 
cosmology became superior authority rather than demonstration, the case for the new 
cosmology became much stronger. As a strategy in managing the cultural tensions of 
the scientific revolution, this is basically a way of exhausting slowly but steadily the 
heuristic potential of the received research program. 
 
3. Anachronistic speculation regarding ancient authors  
Another Jesuit strategy involved addressing questions of this kind: What 
would the major philosophers of antiquity have said had they been with us today? The 
form of this question is particularly valuable. It acknowledges the respect due to 
ancient authorities. It acknowledges moreover the irrefutable value of the new 
evidence. A very clear example of this strategy can be seen in some arguments 
presented by Cornaeus. In his textbook mentioned above, he tackles the issue of 
celestial incorruptibility. Aristotle had repeatedly claimed that the heavens and the 
stars are immutable and incorruptible. They were made up of the fifth element, the 
ether. This belief started to be challenged from the late sixteenth century onwards 
because of various new astronomical observations: comets, sunspots, and hitherto 
unknown stars or planets. The argument advanced by Cornaeus involved imagining 
what Aristotle would have said had he been aware of these observations: 
If Aristotle had lived today, and had seen how we observe changes and 
conflagrations in the Sun, without any doubt he would have changed his mind 
and would have agreed with us. The same reasoning applies to the planets, of 
which the Philosopher never knew more than seven. We nowadays, however, 
by the use of the telescope (access to which he never had) know for certain 
that there are more.19  
 
17 See Russell, “Catholic astronomers and the Copernican system after the condemnation of Galileo.”  
18 Melchior Cornaeus in his Curriculum philosophiae peripateticae, ut hoc tempore in scholis decurri 
solet (Würzburg, 1657) 2: 107, quoted in Hellyer, Catholic Physics, p. 51. 
19 Cornaeus, Curriculum, p. 503. This attitude shows a marked shift from the decades preceding the 
Galileo controversy, when Jesuits used to defend Aristotelian celestial incorruptibility by proposing 
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What kind of reasoning is involved here? No doubt, Cornaeus presupposes a good 
knowledge of Aristotle. It is precisely this good knowledge of Aristotle that enables 
him to go beyond the usual Aristotelian picture. In other words, Cornaeus felt justified 
in affirming the counterfactual conditional statement: if Aristotle were alive today, he 
would have agreed that there are changes in the heavens. This is the first step towards 
a kind of slippery slope. If the statement is true, then it leads to the idea that, if 
Aristotle had agreed to celestial mutability, he would have seen the need to adjust his 
entire cosmology. This in turn leads to the more radical claim that, if Aristotle had 
seen the need to adjust his entire cosmology, he would have become a Copernican. 
Political correctness demanded that only the first claim be explicitly stated.20 The 
Jesuits were here essentially following the example set by Galileo himself, who at 
times argued in a similar fashion. In his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World 
Systems, we find him highlighting the importance of sense experience in scientific 
reasoning. He explicitly states that “we do have in our age new events and 
observations such that if Aristotle were now alive, I have no doubt he would change 
his opinion. This is inferred from his own manner of philosophizing.” Aristotle’s 
conversion would have resulted, according to Galileo, from the crucial principle of 
giving priority to sense experience over natural reason.21 
 From these remarks, it is clear that what I’m calling the strategy of 
anachronistic speculation was a powerful weapon in the hands of those who, like the 
Jesuits, were open to innovation and yet sought to respect tradition. This strategy was 
essentially associated with the idea of rediscovering the real Aristotle. Peripatetic 
doctrine had to be cleaned up from errors that had encrusted upon it since scholastic 
times. As bits of this peripatetic doctrine were replaced by new ideas and concepts, a 
variety of systems were tried out.22 Such piecemeal replacement and adjustment 
continued all through the century I’m considering in this paper and even beyond. 
4. Accumulation of Data 
The third and final strategy I want to highlight involves the avoidance of 
speculation. With evidence in favor of the new cosmology gaining strength, and with 
 
that comets and novae are special divine signs. Cf: William Wallace, Galileo and his sources: the 
heritage of the Collegio Romano in Galileo’s science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 
141. 
20 The idea of celestial incorruptibility was the Achilles heel of the old cosmology. Even those who, 
decades after Galileo’s time, still rejected Copernicanism conceded defeat on the question of the 
heavens’ incorruptibility. One can detect the development in textbooks. For instance, the Jesuit 
Leonardus Cinnamo is still discussing in 1715 the question of the incorruptibility of the heavens as a 
sub-question of whether the heavens are nobler than the earth (see Cinnamo, L., S.J., Microscopium 
Aristotelicum (Panormi: G. Bayona, 1715), Sec. II, 8). By 1739, the situation changes. In chapter II of a 
1739 textbook by Antonio Mayr S.J., entitled Philosophia peripatetica antiquorum principiis, et 
recentiorum experimentis conformata, Vol. III: Physicae particularis Pars I (Ingolstad), the heavens 
are taken as indeed corruptible. Mayr even includes biblical evidence for this (§847). 
21 See Galileo Galilei, Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems, Ptolemaic & Copernican, 
trans. S. Drake (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), p. 50. See also Wallace, Galileo and 
his sources, p. 301. The origins of this mature attitude towards Aristotle can be traced back to Albertus 
Magnus: “Whoever believes that Aristotle was a god, must also believe that he never erred. But if one 
believes that Aristotle was a man, then doubtless he was liable to error just as we are” (Physica lib. 
VIII, tr. 1, xiv).  
22 This claim is amply justified in E. Grant, Planets, stars, and orbs: the medieval cosmos, 1200 –1687 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); by the late seventeenth century, “bits and pieces of 
Aristotelian cosmology were replaced by bits and pieces of the new cosmology. Strange cosmological 
mosaics developed, none of which could win much support” (p. 679). 
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the prohibition against Copernicanism still in force, some Jesuit scholars dedicated 
themselves to sporadic and patchy accumulation of knowledge without any theoretical 
synthesis. They acknowledged the existence and usefulness of novel ideas and 
observations, but didn’t worry much about the need to ensure a coherent system. This 
strategy has both negative and positive aspects.  
The negative aspects include the fact that, as a research strategy, it tended to 
engender eclecticism. The clearest example here is Athanasius Kircher (1602–1680), 
Jesuit professor of mathematics at the Roman College and founder of a renowned 
museum there. In his Mundus Subterraneus, he just fills pages and pages with 
descriptions of a bewildering variety of novelties without any coherent synthetic 
explanation. The novelties he includes strike the modern reader for their sheer variety, 
ranging from useful geological or biological descriptions to useless folklore. It is 
difficult not to agree with William B. Ashworth, Jr. who admits that the Jesuits “do 
indeed seem to merit the praise they have frequently received. And yet when all this is 
said and acknowledged, there still remains the unavoidable feeling that Jesuit science 
was somehow seriously deficient.” The main reason for his judgment is Kircher, who 
“sandwiches descriptions of fossil fish between accounts of gems bearing the images 
of cities and stones in the shape of John the Baptist, and he can sustain such a 
mélange for hundreds of pages. There is no suggestion that some authorities might be 
more reliable than others; every fact or observation seems to be given equal weight.”23 
Traces of eclecticism can be seen even in Riccioli’s Almagestum, especially where he 
discusses new stars. He lists fourteen possible explanations for their appearance, 
together with advantages and disadvantages of each.24 He doesn’t, however, make any 
attempt to choose one of these explanations. He gives the impression that trying to 
arrive at the correct one was not really important. In his judgment, the time was 
apparently not ripe for taking the risk of suggesting a philosophical superstructure for 
all the facts available. He, like Kircher and others who adopted this strategy, limited 
himself to gathering information. He postponed the task of establishing explanatory 
coherence to future generations.  
This is a negative aspect is counterbalanced by at least one significant, positive 
aspect: the beneficial shift of attention from theory to observation. The very meaning 
of the term “observation” was changing during the scientific revolution. In scholastic 
natural philosophy, “experience” had taken the form of universal statements. This was 
because statements of singular events were not evident and indubitable, but relied on 
fallible historical reports. Peter Dear explains:  
In a sense, the Aristotelian model of a science adopted by the Jesuits implied 
that scientific knowledge must be public – the conclusions of scientific 
demonstration would in principle be truths perfectly graspable by all, because 
they were derived from necessary, logical connections between terms 
formulated in premises commanding universal assent. Singular experiences 
 
23 William B. Ashworth, Jr., “Catholicism in Early Modern Science” in: D.C. Lindberg & R.L. 
Numbers (eds.), God and nature: historical essays on the encounter between Christianity and science 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 136–66; quotations from p. 155. On 
Kircher’s style, see: Paula Findlen, “Scientific Spectacle in Baroque Rome: Athanasius Kircher and the 
Roman College Museum” in: Mordechai Feingold (ed.), Jesuit science and the Republic of Letters 
(Cambridge Mass. - London: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 225–84. 
24 Riccioli, Almagestum, Tome II, Libri VIII, Secio II, caput XVII, pp. 174–7. 
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were not public, but known only to a privileged few; consequently, they were 
not suitable elements of scientific discussion.25  
In the early seventeenth century, Jesuit scholars started to include singular experience. 
Their work enhanced the status of discrete events, which thus started to have a role as 
properly accredited knowledge about the world. The Jesuits worked essentially to 
establish two crucial elements in the chain of justification. Private, singular, actual 
experience was related to public, potential experience; and this public, potential 
experience was related to universal, self-evident truths. Thus, habitual private 
experience, which roughly corresponds to the modern understanding of “experiment”, 
started to gain its importance in scientific demonstrations. The hunt for more and 
more evidence became the central issue. One can see, therefore, how the pressure of 
the Roman Inquisition did not stifle the development of science in Catholic countries 
but redirected its attention. It made scientists shift from theory construction to 
collection of data. Jesuit astronomers, for instance, shifted from theoretical to 
observational astronomy. Some of them were quite successful in this area: Riccioli 
and Grimaldi, because of this new shift, managed to map the surface of the moon with 
remarkable accuracy.26 
6. Conclusion 
My original aim was to show how, all along the century following Galileo’s 
first condemnation, Jesuit scholars were, in spite of everything, engaged in genuine 
science. The prohibitions originating from the Vatican and from their own Jesuit 
Curia did leave some valuable space for maneuvering. Exhausting all the potential of 
the received research program was still possible. Of the various strategies in this 
endeavor, I highlighted three: the introduction of probable judgments in natural 
philosophy; anachronistic speculation of what ancient authorities would have done 
had they been faced with the new evidence; and the simple accumulation of data. The 
fact that Jesuits’ research program turned out to be regressive doesn’t show that their 
efforts were unscientific. Once the idea of a crucial experiment, as a gestalt switch 
between paradigms, is rejected as completely unrealistic, we must acknowledge the 
importance of perseverance within a given research program. It is a vital constituent 
of genuine scientific method. Seen in this light, the common assumption that 
seventeenth century Jesuits were blinkered, reactionary Aristotelians, keen on 
blocking at all costs the advance of natural science, loses all its plausibility.  
 Can these strategies help us understand the intellectual output of Jesuits in 
later centuries? If we start with the major Jesuit figure dominating the period just after 
the period covered in this paper, Ruder Bošković (1711–1787), we find similar efforts 
being made even though Aristotelian cosmology was by then quite evidently a 
regressive research program. Bošković started as a defender of Tycho Brahe’s system 
but soon became convinced that Newtonianism should substitute peripatetic natural 
philosophy. His main concern was centered on saving the everyday experience of an 
immobile earth. So he devised his impressive theory of the two kinds of space: a 
relative space in which the Earth is in motion as described by Newton and an absolute 
space in which the Earth stands still. By his time, the balance of probabilities in 
 
25 Peter Dear, “Jesuit mathematical science and the reconstitution of experience in the early seventeenth 
century,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 18 (1987): 133–75 (the quote is from p. 
143).  
26 Cf. Russell, “Catholic astronomers and the Copernican system after the condemnation of Galileo.” 
By 1773, of the world’s 130 astronomy observatories, thirty were operated by Jesuits. There are now 
thirty-five lunar crators named in honor of Jesuit scientists. 
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cosmology had tilted definitely towards heliocentrism. Anachronistic reasoning 
involving ancient authors had become largely irrelevant. In spite of this, Bošković can 
be seen as engaged in work that was still in line with the broad Jesuit effort of 
exhausting all the potential of a received research program before discarding it. He 
was effectively still stretching out to its limits the idea of the immobility of the Earth 
as suggested by daily experience.27  
 A similar stance can be seen in Jesuit scientific work through much of the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Two of the major highlights in this 
later period were the rise of evolutionary biology and the advances in astronomy. The 
way Jesuits have been involved in these two areas shows a similar concern to explore 
all the possibilities before moving on, and a concern to accumulate data.28 Innovation 
and revolutionary thinking is never valued in and for itself. On the contrary, the main 
concern seems to be safeguarding the coherence of a unified system of thought 
ranging from science to philosophy and theology. It is not surprising that the need to 
resist the fragmentation and eventual disintegration of knowledge has been expressly 
recalled by recent Generals.29  
 This style of work situates its protagonists inevitably on the quiet side of 
scientific revolutions. For historians, the tendency is to keep the harbingers of new 
successful research programs in the limelight. Less attention is given to those who do 
the spadework to ensure that a genuine revolution is called for. Both roles, however, 




27 See Žarko Dadić, “Bošković and the question of the earth’s motion,” in The Philosophy of Science 
of`Ruder Bošković, I. Macan and V. Pozaic (eds.), (Zagreb: Institute of Philosophy and Theology, 
1987). 
28 See B. Brundell, “Catholic Church politics and evolution theory, 1894–1902,” British Journal of the 
History of Science 34 (2001), pp. 81–95; S. Maffeo, The Vatican Observatory: in the service of nine 
Popes, trans. G.V. Coyne (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001). 
29 On the fragmentation of knowledge, see P. Arrupe, “Theological reflection and interdisciplinary 
debate” in: Pedro Arrupe, S.J., Jesuit apostolates today, J. Aixala S.J. (ed.) (Institute of Jesuit Sources: 
St. Louis USA, 1981), pp. 33–42; “The intellectual apostolate in the Society’s mission,” Ibid., pp. 111–
26. See also, Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, “The Jesuit university in the light of the Ignatian charism,” 
Address to the International Meeting of Jesuit Higher Education, Rome, 27 May, 2001 (available on the 
internet at http://users.online.be/~sj.eur.news/doc/univ2001e.htm). 
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